dependent on imported sources of oil and it affects the national security of this country. What do they propose to do about it? They don't have an answer.

I will talk more on this tomorrow when we have further information on OPEC.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, March 24, 2000, the Federal debt stood at $5,730,876,091,058.27 (Five trillion, seven hundred thirty billion, eight hundred seventy-six million, ninety-one thousand, fifty-eight dollars and twenty-seven cents).

One year ago, March 24, 1999, the Federal debt stood at $5,645,339,000,000 (Five trillion, six hundred forty-five billion, three hundred thirty-nine million).

Five years ago, March 24, 1995, the Federal debt stood at $4,846,988,000,000 (Four trillion, eight hundred forty-six billion, nine hundred eighty-eight million).

Twenty-five years ago, March 24, 1975, the Federal debt stood at $505,328,000,000 (Five hundred five billion, three hundred twenty-eight million) which reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion—$5,225,548,091,058.27 (Five trillion, two hundred twenty-five billion, five hundred forty-eight million, ninety-one thousand, fifty-eight dollars and twenty-seven cents) during the past 25 years.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

SEAPOWER

• Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, over the past several years, our nation's military has become increasingly overcommitted and underfunded—facing problems from recruiting and retention, to cuts in active fleet numbers and a dwindling active duty force. Yet in spite of these problems, the United States' naval power, with it's fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines, life-saving Coast Guard and Merchant Marine forces, and highly skilled sailors and mariners, is the best in the world. These components are a part of one of the most technologically sophisticated defense systems in the world. In Kings Bay, Georgia, we are fortunate to be home to the greatest submarine base in the nation, Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base. During my visits there, however, I have heard time and again how detrimental the growing gap between commitments and funding has become.

I believe that by appropriating additional funds to our nation's defense system and by supporting efforts to create a larger force structure, we will resolve or at least begin to remedy some of these problems that are facing today's military forces. Since I came to the Senate in 1997, I have supported funding for procurement, research and development, and readiness. In order for the United States to retain it's role as a military super power, we must pay attention to the gaps that exist today and prevent further deterioration in our armed forces. If we do not reverse this trend now, a very high price will be paid tomorrow for our collective lethargy on defense issues and for the massive under-funding of our armed forces.

Mr. President, I now respectfully request that an article from the January, 2000 edition of Seapower magazine be inserted into the RECORD, as I believe it accurately and appropriately outlines the existing gap between our commitments and resources, and effectively argues the case for remedying this situation.

Thank you.

[From Almanac of Seapower, Jan. 2000]

A TALE OF TWO CENTURIES

(By John Fisher)

The old century had come to an end and the United States, its armed services triumphant from victory in a splendid little war over a technologically inferior adversary, as ready to take its rightful place among the major military and economic powers of the world. A former assistant secretary of the Navy, who became a national hero in that war, was soon to become president and use his bully pulpit for, among other things, the building of a Great White Fleet that was the first step in making the United States a naval power ''second to none.''

That former assistant secretary, later president, Theodore Roosevelt, was a shrewd judge of human nature and a life-long student of American history. He knew that most of his fellow Americans had little if any interest in foreign affairs, or in national-security issues in general. Roosevelt himself was a staunch advocate of the seapower principles postulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, whom he greatly admired. So to remedy the situation he helped found the Navy League of the United States in 1902, contributing significant financial as well as moral support.

There were many, of course, in the Congress and in the media—indeed, in Roosevelt's own cabinet—who were not sure that the Great White Fleet was needed. It cost too much and, despite its fine appearance, would have little if any practical value for a nation unchallenged in its own hemisphere and unlikely ever to send its sons to fight in Europe's wars, much less Asia's. Besides, there might be an occasional colonial war here and there, but the possibility of a direct war between the major powers of Europe was becoming more and more remote with each passing year.

Within less than five years the vision of a lasting peace throughout the world was demolished when the Japanese Navy shocked the world by defeating the Russian Navy in the Battle of Tsushima (27–28 May 1905), sinking eight Russian battleships and seven Russian cruisers. The Japanese fleet, which started the war a year earlier with a surprise attack on Russian ships anchored in Port Arthur, lost three torpedo boats at Tsushima.

Less than a decade later The Great War—''the war to end all wars,'' it was called—started in Europe. The United States remained a nonparticipant until April 1917, but then entered the war in force. U.S. seapower contributed significantly to the eventual Allied success. The joyous Armistice of 11 November 1918, however, was followed by the debacle at Versailles that sowed the seeds of World War II.

Again, America and its allies were not prepared. The United States once again stayed on the sidelines until jolted out of its lethargy by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: That put 15 million American men and women in uniform, led to total mobilization of the U.S. economy—and of the mighty U.S. industrial base—and resulted in millions of deaths later on the unconditional surrender of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The century was less than half over, but it was already the most violent in all human history.

This time around, some lessons were learned—but not very well, and they were not remembered very long. When North Korea invaded South Korea the United States again was unprepared—as it was a generation later in Vietnam. The Cold War cast a nuclear shadow over the entire world for more than four decades, though, and forced the much-needed rebuilding, modernization, and upgrading of America's armed forces.

As the world enters a new century, and new millennium, those forces are the most powerful, most mobile, and most versatile in the world. Moreover, the young Americans in service today are the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped in this nation's history. But that does not mean that they are capable of carrying out all of the numerous difficult and exceedingly complex missions they have been assigned. The victories of the past are no guarantee of success in future conflicts. And it is not foreordained that the so-called ''American century'' that has now ended will be extended by another uninterrupted period of U.S. economic and military dominance.

Operation Allied Force, the U.S./NATO air war over Kosovo, is a helpful case in point. The precision strikes against Serbian forces, and against the civilian infrastructure of the former Yugoslavia, eventually led to the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo and the occupation of that battered province by U.S./NATO and Russian peacekeepers. The one-sided ''war'' lasted much longer than originally estimated, though. It did not ''stop the killings'' (of ethnic Albanians), the original purpose of the war. And it left Slobodan Milosevic still in power in Belgrade.

It is perhaps inevitable that political leaders will focus almost exclusively on the ''victories''—however fleeting and however gossamer—that can be claimed. The prudent military commander, though, will focus on the problem areas, the near-defeats and potential disasters, the ''What-ifs'' and the close calls. There were an abundance of all of these in Kosovo last year—just as there were in the war with Iraq in 1990–91.

Logistics is the first and perhaps most important of those problem areas—and the biggest ''What if'' as well. In both conflicts. In the war with Iraq the question was ''What if Saddam Hussein had not stopped with Kuwait but continued into Saudi Arabia and all the way to Riyadh?'' The answer—on this, virtually all military analysts agree—is that the war would have lasted much longer and would have cost much more in both lives and money. As it was, it took the greatest sealift in history before the vastly superior U.S./coalition forces could defeat the previously overrated Iraqi army. That massive sealift—more than 10 million tons of supplies carried halfway around the world—would have been impossible, though, were it not for the fact that, on the receiving end, Saudi Arabia had built a large, modern, and well-protected port infrastructure.

Logistics was not a problem in Kosovo, either—but only because the U.S./NATO air